[e2e] What if there were no well known numbers?

[John Day]

You are absolutely correct.   Well-known sockets were a kludge.  An 
expediency so that we could test the 3 applications we had and get 
ready for a demo.  They weren't intended to last forever, or even 
very long.  But since we went 20 years with no new applications, a 
lot of people began to make up myths as to why they were a great 
idea.  We have to guard those the stone tablets after all.

Well-known sockets are just one indication that what we have is an 
unfinished demo.

Take care,
John


At 17:17 -0500 2006/08/02, John Kristoff wrote:
>Could the removal of well known numbers actually be a rousing change
>more fundamental to the Internet architecture than anything we've seen
>before, even more so than commercialization, Microsoft Windows
>implementation nuances, NATs and multihoming.  Indulge me for a momment.
>
>There is a Internet Draft that has as part of the file name
>"no-more-well-known-ports".  The basic idea is that DNS SRV lookups
>should be used to determine a unique port with which to get service
>from the intended destination server.
>
>In some ways this approach is appealing.  I thought it might be a
>nice way to slow the tide of arbitrary protocol port filtering and
>hamper common remote attacks against a particular well known service.
>
>Looking ahead a bit howver, if this were widely implemented, what
>other outcomes might we see given some time?  DNS would become
>increasingly important of course.  Maybe even enough for a small
>boom market within that sector.  I can envision companies selling
>boxes that "mangle" or proxy SRV responses in the name of some
>defined site policy.
>
>In short, couldn't this, wouldn't this, lead to a rapid rise in DNS-
>based walled gardens (or if you prefer the quick and steady rise of
>a fractured root, eventual modus operandi) as everyone moves to
>replace their udp/tcp packet manglers with RR-scrubbers?
>
>Am I way off here?
>
>John