[e2e] 100% NAT - a DoS proof internet

[Jon Crowcroft]

In missive <43F1FBF8.10409 at isi.edu>, Joe Touch typed:

 >>Jon Crowcroft wrote:
 >>> um, i think you need to re-read about DHTs and consistent hashes
 
 >>What I was saying was that this variant won't work behind a NAT. I
 >>mistook that from your initial post; I still consider it accurate, but
 >>it may be off topic.

 >>However....

 >>This is basically just frequency allocation. Each algorithm would have
 >>its preferred frequency; assuming that endpoints are sync'd, you 'meet'
 >>on the same frequency as the other end you want to speak with.

yes, kind of!
 >>Unfortunately, unless the algorithm or some mutual offset (aka 'key')
 >>between the endpoints is predeployed, the attacker code will know (and
 >>use) the same mechanism and with the same algorithm. I.e., it'll send a
 >>DHTime request, get a meeting time, and send its attack that way.
right

 >>Either this will slow down legitimate applications, or attackers will
 >>just mimic legitimate applications and move on. Time-based attacks are
 >>not uncommon - consider window attacks on TCP.
 
that is a good point!
 >>
 >>
 >>
 >>--------------enigF8FF148498E264F17EE76BD4
 >>Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc"
 >>Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature
 >>Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc"
 >>
 >>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 >>Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (MingW32)
 >>Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
 >>
 >>iD8DBQFD8fv4E5f5cImnZrsRApynAJ9lK/An8IhoC6Wba5wpCeAThoE3bACglicl
 >>2LNhmBx1XwSBDMkaAQl1XU8=
 >>=7+Vr
 >>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 >>
 >>--------------enigF8FF148498E264F17EE76BD4--

 cheers

   jon